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At the Heart of Justice: Combating Gang-Perpetrated Witness Intimidation with Forfeiture-by-
Wrongdoing After Giles v. California1 
By: Katie M. McDonough* 
"[T]here is hardly any reason to apply a burden of proof which might encourage behavior which 
strikes at the heart of the system of justice itself."2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Gangs are a growing threat to the communities in which they operate as well as to the 
operation of the criminal justice system? Inherent in gang culture is strong loyalty among gang 
members coupled with "no snitching" policies enforced through intimidation and retaliation.4 
Witnesses to crime, gang members who have knowledge of misdeeds, and even entire 
communities are fearful about coming forward and cooperating with law enforcement about what 
they know.5 The risk they run by cooperating with law enforcement is real: many witnesses are 
attacked or killed, and people in gang-controlled communities who report crimes to law 
enforcement face the prospect of crimes against their person, property, and family members.6 
Criminal gangs benefit from enforcing "no snitch" policies using intimidation and retribution.7 
Successful witness intimidation or murder renders a witness unavailable, which means 
that the witness's testimony is likely to be inadmissible in court.8 This often forces prosecutors 
to delay trial, reduce charges, or drop a case altogether, bringing the wheels of justice to a 
I 353 U.S. 554 (2008). 
• Katie M. McDonough, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2013; College ofthe Holy Cross, 2008. 
2 U.S. v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269,273 (2d Cir. 1982). 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 3831--403-9, 55M. 
4 See infra note~%. 
5 See infra note W3 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra note 10394, 1Q_4%. 
7 See infra text accompanying note 1 0899. 
8 FED. R. EVID. 802 (restyled). 
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grinding halt.9 The evidentiary doctrine of "forfeiture by wrongdoing" provides a means to 
overcome the hurdle of an unavailable witness if the government can show that the defendant's 
conduct caused the unavailability of the witness and did so with the requisite intent to silence 
him.10 The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, as it stands, leaves open the possibility that a 
defendant who joined a gang with a known enforcement policy against "snitching" will benefit if 
members of his gang unilaterally intimidate witnesses called against him. Under the federal rule, 
the prosecution will, at the very least, have to prove that the defendant "acquiesced" in the 
intimidation.11 If the testimony in question contains testimonial statements, the prosecution will 
have to take the extra step of showing "specific intent," which, if narrowly construed, will allow 
the defendant to benefit from intimidation by his peers as long as he did not specifically take part 
in or authorize the intimidation.12 
One challenge in many gang-related trials is finding proof that a gang member-defendant 
took part in the intimidation, specifically intended it to occur, and was a direct cause of it. While 
a defendant is in jail awaiting trial, his fellow gang members are often able and willing to act on 
his behalf and carry out his gang's "no snitch" policy by terrorizing, intimidating, harming, or 
even murdering adverse witnesses, mandating a miscarriage of justice in the process. 13 Gang 
members will harm or kill witnesses in retaliation for cooperating with police.14 The "no snitch" 
9 See infra note 1 05%. 
10 See generally Giles v. Cal., 554 U.S. 353 (2008); see infra text accompanying note 167-l-§.6. 
11 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (restyled). 
12 See infra text accompanying note .l.Ql-1-§t). 
13 E.g., David Kocieniewski, With Witnesses at Risk, Murder Suspects Go Free, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, available 
at http://www .nytimes.com/1996/12/22/nyregion/gang-rivahy-cited-in-police-captain-s-
shooting.html?re:f=davidkocieniewsk (describing how prolific witness intimidation in New Jersey turns "slam-dunk 
cases" into failed prosecutions, like the case of one particular gang member, who witnessed a murder but "quickly 
announced he would never testify for fear he would be ostracized for helping the police-or wind up murdered 
himself') [hereinafter Witnesses At Risk]. 
14 E.g., Urias v. Borel, No. CV 07-7155-NS (RNB), 2008 WL 4363064, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (civilian 
bystander to gang shooting was instructed not to attend court and then shot to death). 
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policy is enforced against gang members and civilians alike.15 With key witnesses unavailable, a 
prosecutor is hard-pressed to continue his case because he cannot admit the witness's prior 
statements without an exception, such as the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine.16 
This Comment addresses the unique challenges of invoking forfeiture by wrongdoing 
against a gang member defendant whose gang silences adverse witnesses on his behalf. Part II 
illustrates that gang culture inspires loyalty in its members, who willingly intimidate and silence 
witnesses in accordance with a gang's "no snitch" policy. It explains how gangs can subdue an 
entire community using terror, threats, and violence to ensure that citizens do not cooperate with 
the police, and it demonstrates that such "no snitch" policies, when enforced through 
intimidation and retaliation, hinder the criminal justice process. Part III suggests that Congress 
and state legislatures should amendforfeiture-by-wrongdoing evidentiary rules to declare that 
proof that a gang member-defendant who joined a gang with a history of enforcing a "no snitch" 
policy using intimidation or retaliation-or remained a member with knowledge that the gang 
engaged in such tactics-coupled with evidence that other gang members caused an adverse 
witness's unavailability in the defendant's trial, constitutes sufficient evidence of specific intent 
to silence a witness in accordance with the requirements of the evidentiary and Constitutional 
exceptions. 
II. LOST TESTIMONY: GANG-ENFORCED "No SNITCH" POLICIES SILENCE WITNESSES 
Organized street gangs are not a new phenomenon, and street-gang culture is not a 
contemporary invention. It is a common occurrence in many urban communities, new immigrant 
15 E.g., David Kocieniewski, A Little Girl Shot, and a Crowd that Didn't See, N.Y. TIMES, Jul 9, 2007, available at 
http://www .nytimes.com/2007 /07 /09/nyregion/09taj.html?pagewanted=all (relating how the grandmother of a 
seven-year-old girl killed in the crossflre of a gang flght would not talk to the police for fear she would "have to 
move out of the country, and that at least twenty other eyewitnesses remain unwilling to testify about this unsolved 
homicide). 
16 Witnesses at Risk, supra note .U-h!. 
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groups, and poverty-stricken neighborhoods with few social controls. 17 Poverty, heterogeneity 
of race or ethnicity, and residential mobility are, together, indicators of a high degree of 
delinquency in a community.18 Such a community is ripe for the development of street gangs. 
Frederick M. Thrasher, an early twentieth-century criminologist, described the development of 
gangs in this way: 
The gang is an interstitial group originally formed spontaneously, and then 
integrated through conflict. It is characterized by the following types of behavior: 
meeting face to face, milling, movement through space as a unit, conflict, and 
planning. The result of this collective behavior is the development of tradition, 
unreflective internal structure, esprit de corps, solidarity, morale, group 
awareness, and attachment to a local territory. 19 
Gang members, even if organized informally, share experiences and loyalty that forms them into 
a cohesive unit.20 A 1928 chronicle of the rise of early nineteenth-century gangs in New York 
City explained that poverty, instability at home, lack of direction, and community 
disorganization fostered the development of gangsters in those urban slums.21 Even then, 
welfare agencies and religious leaders faced seemingly insurmountable challenges in combating 
the petty crime, violence, gambling, widespread alcohol abuse, starvation, and squalor among 
which the gangs proliferated?2 
17 Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence, and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in 
Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 189 (2008) ("[C]onditions of structural poverty strain a 
community's ability to develop informal social controls. Socially organized or cohesive communities are better able 
to engage in informal social control that can lead to lower levels of crime than communities that are not cohesive."). 
18 SOPHIE BODY-GENDROT, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CITIES?: A CO:MJ>ARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 7 (Blackwe112000) 
(referencing the observation of criminologists Shaw and McKay that it is difficult to free a neighborhood from these 
conditions). 
19 FREDERICK M. THRASHER, THE GANG: A STUDY OF 1,313 GANGS IN CHICAGO 46 (1927). 
20 ALBERTK. COHEN, DELINQUENT BOYS: THE CULTURE OF THE GANG 13,35 (The Free Press 1955). They share a 
"delinquent subculture" that ''is itself a positive code with a defmite if unconventional moral flavor." Id 
21 HERBERT ASBURY, THE GANGS OF NEW YORK xvi (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1928). 
22 ld, at 15-16. 
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Gangs manifest their own norms comprising unique rules and customs. 23 Gang culture is 
not a new phenomenon: even gangs in the early twentieth century possessed their own names, 
clothing styles, reputations, and lore?4 At bottom, the unique style and identifying characteristics 
of each of those street gangs is not dissimilar to the gang colors, graffiti signs, turf wars, and 
criminal enterprises that contemporary street gangs have adopted. Today, gang members are 
tattooed with gang identifiers, wear certain style of dress adopted by their gang, and display gang 
insignia on jackets, hats, and pants?5 Hispanic gangs often wear white tee shirts and a black or 
blue knit cap, while black gangs such as Blood and Crip gangs dress individually but wear red or 
blue accessories, respectively.26 Graffiti is utilized to mark gang turf, indicate gang status, make 
threats against a rival gang, or declare participation in a particular crime that was committed.27 
Gangs set themselves apart from the communities that they seek to control.28 A 1950s 
examination of delinquent youth gangs concluded that gangs emphasize their autonomy and 
capitulate only to internal pressures, causing "intensely solidary and imperious" relations with 
gang members and "indifferent, hostile and rebellious" relations with non-gang members and 
23 E.g., Ray Rivera, In Newburgh, Gangs and Violence Reign, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/201 0/05/12/nyregion/12newburgh.html?sq=gang%20culture&st=nyt&adxnnl=1&scp=3&a 
dxnnlx=1329195879-V9JrNbOnzk7fWHmncqs8CA&pagewanted=1 (describing growth of local street gangs in 
Newburgh, New York and referencing gang flags, clothing, and the concept of"respecf'); Serge F. Kovaleski, 
Wanted: A Band of Men and Boys, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,2007, available at 
http:/ /query .nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B02E4D7153 9F936A257 5BCOA9619C8B63&scp= 1 O&sq=gang% 
20culture&st=nyt&pagewanted=1 (describing the recruiting tactics ofMS-13 in New Jersey, its origins as a 
Salvatorian gang, and its colors). 
24 ASBURY, supra note 21~, at 28. For instance, in New York, the Daybreak Boys operated as an organized 
criminal enterprise committing heinous crimes on the riverfront, and the Molasses Gang would systematically rob 
stores and pick pockets. Id at 66. The Dead Rabbits wore a red stripe on their pants, while the Plug Uglies, 
wearing plug hats, were feared for instilling terrible violence on their victims with bludgeons and pistols. I d. at 22. 
25 Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern California (Gang Characteristics), L.A. 
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2004, http://lang.dailynews.com/socal!gangs/articles/dnp4_gcharacter.asp [hereinafter Gang 
Characteristics]. 
26Id 
27 Id 
28 Joseph Goldstein, 43 in Two Warring Gangs are Indicted in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/0l/20/nyregion/43-in-warring-brooklyn-gangs-are-
indicted.html?scp=1&sq=gang+culture+kelly+respect&st=nyt (quoting Brooklyn district attorney's statement that 
street gang members in Brooklyn "band together to control their turf, their block or their building, and terrorize 
those who fail to recognize their control and fail to pay them respect"). 
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authority figures?9 This view of the delinquent youth gang is instructive-even if articulated 
before the proliferation of guns and drugs that characterize street gangs today-because it 
reinforces the assertion that the fundamental characteristics of gangs remain unchanged over 
time and place. Contemporary gang members may characterize their activity as a war between 
themselves and "the haves," and others will go as far as shootingrivals and police officers to 
make a name for themselves?0 In either case, they are acting outside of the law and traditional 
norms. Gangs set themselves apart from their communities through active intimidation of 
residents and police officers in (often successful) attempts to establish control and instill fear.31 
While not all street gangs are criminal, the gangs with which this Comment (and law 
enforcement) is concerned are those that engage in crime regularly. Although each law-
enforcement organization has its own definition of what constitutes a "gang," nearly all list 
group criminality as the most important defining characteristic.32 Local street gangs may be 
driven by the desire to control a neighborhood, such as the "Goodfellas," "one of Central 
Harlem's most violent and destructive street gangs" that trafficked in firearms used to intimidate 
29 COHEN, supra note 20+9, at 30-31. 
30 Tracy Manzer, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern California (From His Own 
Words), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 27, 2004, http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/articles/lbp2 james. asp. 
31 Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern California (Gangster 
Menace), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 30, 2004, http:/ /lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/articles/dnp5 _main. asp 
[hereinafter Gangster Menace]. 
32 National Youth Gang Survey Analysis: Defining Gangs and Designating Gang Membership, NAT'L GANG CTR., 
available at http://www .nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-Analysis/Defming-Gangs#anchordcog (last visited Dec. 18, 
2011). There are six defmitional characteristics that are common to most defmitions: (1) whether the group engages 
in criminality; (2) whether leadership is present; (3) whether the group has a name; ( 4) whether it displays colors or 
symbols; (5) whether the group hangs out together; and (6) whether the group has a turf or territory. I d. "Gangs" in 
the school setting may be defined as "a somewhat organized group, sometimes having turf concerns, symbols, 
special dress or colors ... has a special interest in violence for status-providing purposes and is recognized as a gang 
by its members and by others," and as a group that "has a name and is engaged in fighting, stealing, or selling 
drugs." GARY D. GOTTFREDSON & DENISE C. GOTTFREDSON, GANG PROBLEMS AND GANG PROGRAMS IN A 
NATIONAL SAMPLE OF SCHOOLS 4 (2001), available at 
http://www.gottfredson.com/Gang_Problems_%20Programs/report.pdf. 
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rivals and keep them off Goodfella turf. 33 Gang activity is often conducted for reputational gain, 
both for the individual (as in the case of a Fairfax, Virginia MS-13 associate34 sentenced to life in 
prison for offering young girls "free of charge to full-fledged gang members to improve his own 
standing"35) and for the gang (as in the case of an officer shot purposely to demonstrate to a rival 
gang that the shooter's gang was tough36). Some gangs make group criminality their primary 
purpose. 37 Large-scale organizations not only mastermind racketeering and narcotics trafficking 
for commercial gain, but "a slew of gangs, including the Bloods, Crips, Gangster Disciples, Vice 
Lords and Latin Kings are branching out into mortgage fraud, identity theft, the manufacturing of 
counterfeit checks, and bank fraud. "38 Today, gangs are active in all fifty states and, in some 
communities, are responsible for up to eighty percent of crime. 39 They are the main retail 
distributors of illegal drugs across the country and are increasingly involved in wholesale 
distribution.40 But gang members do not merely engage in the drug trade. Alien-smuggling, 
33 Colin Moynihan, Prosecutors Target Gang in Harlem; 19 Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/nyregion/19-arrested-as-prosecutors-target-goodfellas-gang-in-
harlem.html? r=1. 
34Gang Char~teristics, supra note 2524 (explaining that "associates" are not gang members but rather are on the 
fringe of gang activity; however, rivals often do not distinguish between a gang member and his associates). 
35 Andrea McCarren, MSJ3 Street Gang and Others Tied to Child Prostitution, 9 NEWS Now, Nov. 4, 2011, 
http://www.wusa9.com/news/article/173540/187/Feds-Prosecute-Gang-Related-Child-Sex-Traffickers; see, e.g., 
Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern California (Grieving Mothers), 
L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2004, http://lang.dailnews.com/social/gangs/articles/dnp6_main.asp [hereinafter Grieving 
Mothers] (explaining that a gang member's motive for killing an innocent victim in a drive-by shooting was to 
increase his standing within a Pacioma, California gang). 
36E.g., David Kocieniewski, Gang Rivalry Cited in Police Captain's Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1996, at 40, 
available at http://www .nytimes.com/1996/12/22/nyregion/gang-rivalry-cited-in-police-captain-s-
shooting.html?re:f=davidkocieniewski. 
37 For a historic example, see ASBURY, supra note 21;w, at 227-28 (describing gangs like the Whyos, a pre-Civil 
War New York City gang that committed crime for money, including murder, mayhem, breaking bones, or even 
chewing off a victim's ear). 
38 Loren Berlin, Street Gangs Clean Up on White Collar Crime, DAILY FINANCE, Oct. 28, 2011, 
http://www .daily:finance.com/20 11/1 0/28/street-gangs-new-dirty-moneymaker-white-collar-crime/. 
39 Key Findings: National Gang Threat Assessment 2009, iii NAT'L GANG INTEL. CTR. (Jan., 2009), available at 
http:/lwww.jbi.gov/stats-services/publications/national-gang-threat-assessment-2009-pdf. There are nearly one 
million active gang members in the United States participating in the criminal activity of approximately 20,000 
street gangs, motorcycle gangs, and prison gangs. Gangs, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Nov. 6, 2011), 
http://www .fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc _ maj orthefts/gangs/gangs. 
4
° Key Findings: National Gang Threat Assessment 2009, supra note 393-&. 
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armed robbery, auto theft, extortion, identity theft, and murder are among gangs' typical criminal 
activities today.41 
Gangs defend their turf and fight rivals, such as today' s much-publicized enmity between 
the Bloods and the Crips.42 At its worst, gang street fighting-whether with muskets and pistols 
two centuries ago or handguns and automatics today-can hold an entire neighborhood 
hostage.43 The presence of rival groups brings potential threats to an existing gang.44 This 
increases gang unity and "fosters beliefs that protection comes from gang cohesion and the 
preparation for violence. "45 Gang violence has a cyclical nature that strengthens the perception 
that being a gang member is necessary for protection, and thus gangs grow and perpetrate 
violence against rivals to ensure that protection continues.46 Gangs also may operate together to 
combat a common enemy; for instance, members and associates of the Mexican Mafia operate in 
various gangs outside of jail but work together for the Mexican Mafia while in jail.47 
41 National Youth Gang Survey Analysis, supra note 323+. 
42 E.g., Grieving Mothers, supra note 3534 (explaining the origins of the war between the Bloods and the Crips and 
noting that, for decades, the majority of gang murders in Los Angeles have been attributable to it). 
43 Keith Donoghue, Note, Casualties of War: Criminal Drug Law Enforcement and its Special Costs for the Poor, 
77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1776, 1786-87 (2002) ("Poor urban communities are the locus for drug transactions, which 
brings with them violence aimed to protect contested territory and intimidate informants."); ASBURY, supra note 
21;w, at 29 ("Sometimes the battles raged for two or three days without cessation, while the streets of the gang area 
were barricaded with carts and paving stones, and the gangsters blazed away at each other with musket and pistol .. 
. . "); see also Videtta A. Brown, Gang Member Perpetrated Domestic Violence: A New Conversation, 7 U. MD. L. 
J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 395, 402 (2007) ('~When gang members are present, the atmosphere in 
neighborhoods is riddled with fear."). 
44 GOTTFREDSON, supra note 323+, at 7 (focusing on the rise of youth gangs in schools). 
45ld 
46 I d. ('~[F]ear of violence leads to participation in the instigation of violence against sources of perceived threat."). 
It is difficult not to be reminded of the scene set by Thomas Hobbes as he portrayed of the state of nature: 
During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that 
condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man. . . . In such 
condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently ... 
no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of 
man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." 
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 86 (Forgotton Books 2008). 
47 People v. Sisneros, 174 Cal.App.4th 142, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). The Mexican Mafia, or Eme, is a particularly 
fearsome gang that raises money by committing crimes, including murder, and employing various local 
neighborhood gangs to collect ~~axes" from drug dealers. ld A member of a street gang may become an Eme 
associate by earning money for the gang and assaulting inmates as instructed, and an associate may become one of 
its few members by gaining a sponsor and executing a killing on behalf of the gang. I d. The price of leaving the 
8 
Perhaps most fundamental to gangs is that they inspire and demand loyalty. The gang 
becomes, to members, "a separate, distinct and often irresistible focus of attraction, loyalty and 
solidarity."48 By and large, whether a gang is made up of mere delinquents· or hardened criminals 
willing to engage in gun violence, drug sales, and turf wars, all gangs retain cultural codes to 
which members adhere.49 These codes generally mandate solidarity and loyalty to fellow gang 
members, 50 akin to family ties. 51 Many gangs have elaborate initiation procedures that can 
include getting 'jumped in"-beat up by admitted members-to demonstrate total dedication to 
the gang. 52 Another common ritual for admittance is commission of a violent crime. 53 In many 
violent gangs, members must commit murder-often of a perfect stranger-to show their loyalty 
gang is death, and members and associates are permitted neither to admit their affiliation with the Mexican Mafia 
nor cooperate with law enforcement and inform on other affiliates. ld at 147--48. Cooperation among rival gangs is 
not new: feuding gangs in nineteenth-century New York City at times joined to fight a common rival gang, ASBURY, 
supra note 21;w, at 29, or attack police to render law enforcement ineffective on their turf. ld at 24, 44, 235. 
48 COHEN, supra note 20-l-9, at 31. 
49 See, e.g., Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern California (L.A. 
Gang History Runs Deep), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2004, 
http://lang.dailnews.com/social/gangs/articles/dnp6 _ main.asp [hereinafter L.A. Gang History] (''Loyalty remains 
across geographic boundaries, with gang members keeping their affiliations as they change addresses across town or 
across the country."). 
50 Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the "Ongoing Emergency": A Pragmatic Approach to Hearsay Evidence in the 
Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 729,777 (2008) (observing that in gangs, "loyalty to the 
organization and hierarchy within the organization are strong forces that impact the relationships of the members of 
the organization," causing members to be reluctant to accuse one another and may be unwilling to cooperate with 
law enforcement out of fear of"serious harm to the accuser's welfare"). 
51 E.g., 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASIAN AMERICAN ISSUES TODAY 859 (Edith Wen-Chu Chen & Grace J. Yoo eds., 
ABC-CLIO, LLC 2010) (explicating that at-risk Asian American youths fmd comraderie, security, and cultural pride 
in joining street gangs, but with these benefits comes the need to retain the respect of this new "family" by 
witnessing or committing violent crimes). 
52 E.g., State of Arizona v. McCoy, 928 P.2d 647, 650 (Ariz. 1996) (holding as evidence supporting conviction for 
participating in a criminal street gang that the defendant participated in his gang's "aggravated assaults on an 
ongoing basis as part of their ritual for initiating new members and ousting disloyal members," called "jumping in"). 
53 See People v. Garcia, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 104, 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (recounting expert opinion that "respect is 
'everything' to a gang member" and that both gangs and gang members earn respect by committing crimes, 
"especially violent crimes"); see, e.g., AUGUSTINE E. COSTELLO, HISTORY OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT OF JERSEY 
CITY 229 (The Police Relief Assoc. Publ'n Co. 1891) (stating that membership in the Lavas gang required a 
robbery, burglary, a single-handed assault on a police officer, or going to jail as a recruit). 
9 
and gain full membership. 54 Women who wish to join are "sexed in," or forced to have sex with 
gang members. 55 
Gang culture vigorously enforces a ban on assisting the police.56 Specifically, gangs 
discourage giving information to police, called "snitching,"57 even against members of other 
gangs. 58 Without resort to the legal system to enforce contracts and regulate underground 
commerce, gangs-particularly those involved in the drug trade-must employ intimidation and 
murder of informants and suspected informants to protect their business. 59 Gangsters make no 
secret of the fact that ratting out others in the business can have dire consequences.60 In 2004, a 
much-circulated DVD titled "Stop Snitching" featured Baltimore gangsters who named names of 
snitches "in the game" and stated that snitches might "get a hole in their head."61 In a Colorado 
54 Alan Jackson, Prosecuting Gang Cases: What Local Prosecutors Need to Know, 42~JUN PROSECUTOR 32, 33-34 
(National District Attorneys Association 2008); Brown, supra note 43~, at 408. This initiation procedure is not 
unique to contemporary street gang culture. E.g., ASBURY, supra note 21;1{), at 227 (relating tales of the Whyo 
gang, which accepted members only after they committed a murder or other crime serious enough to demonstrate 
dedication to the gang). 
55 Videtta A. Brown, supra note43~. 
56 E.g., David Kocieniewski, So Many Crimes, and Reasons to Not Cooperate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,2007, 
http://www .nytimes.com/2007 /12/3 O/nyregion/30witness.html?re:f=davidkocieniewski ("~[T]he Whitman Park 
section of Camden is on the front lines of the struggle with witness intimidation. An array of powerful forces 
converge here to discourage people from cooperating with the investigation of crimes-crimes committed against 
their own homes, their own neighbors, their own children. Drugs are sold openly from street corners and abandoned 
row houses. Gunfrre is a neighborhood soundtrack. And the competing gangs that control Whitman Park have made 
it clear that the price for defYing them is death."). 
57 See ALEXANDRA NAT APOFF, SNITCHING 3 (2009). Snitching was originally a word reserved for criminals who 
ratted out their associates in exchange for a lighter sentence or reduced charges, id., but a "mentality has started to 
seep into the neighborhood where ordinary, upstanding people who would come forward because a crime occurred 
are now being told they are snitches." Brendan L. Smith, Keeping A 'Snitch' from Being Scratched: Witness 
Intimidation Is Gaining Even As the Murder Rate Declines, 94~DEC A.B.A. J. 20, 21 (2008) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
58 E.g., People v. Sisneros, 174 Cal. App. 4th 142, 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). In Sisneros, a shooting was perpetrated 
by an alleged associate of the Mexican Mafia, and an innocent witness-who was a member of a separate Hispanic 
street gang-knew the identity of the shooter. I d. Not only did the witness refuse to "snitch" to the police, he would 
not return to the neighborhood where the shooting took place, nor was he safe in police custody from the possibility 
of being beaten or killed because he witnessed the crime. I d. 
59 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Solving the Drug Enforcement Dilemma: Lessons From Economics, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
207,220 (1994). 
60 See Witnesses at Risk, supra note 13~. 
61 NATAPOFF, supra note 57~, at 122. 
10 
case,62 a defendant was found guilty of charges including ftrst-degree murder for paying his 
friend and two members of an ethnic Cambodian gang a total of $20,000 to shoot and kill a 
cooperating witness after the witness implicated the defendant in the sale and distribution of 
drugs.63 
"No Snitching" is now a popular refrain that summarizes gang culture's ban on police 
cooperation.64 The producer of the "No Snitching" DVD65 insisted that the DVD was directed at 
criminal associates, not "civilian witnesses,"66 but it became a popular symbol that extended 
beyond the world of gangsters. ''Stop Snitching" tee shirts began to appear in courtrooms to 
intimidate non-gang-afftliated witnesses, 67 celebrity rappers such as Lil' Kim and Busta Rhymes 
publicly refused to share information about shootings they witnessed, 68 and commentators began 
to cover the "No Snitching" phenomenon in mainstream media. 69 
While "No Snitching" used to be a policy reserved for gang members, regular citizens in 
some communities are treated as "snitches" simply for talking to or cooperating with law 
enforcement.70 The 2000 National Youth Gang Survey stated that gang-related witness 
intimidation was reported as "common" by sixty-six percent of responding law-enforcement 
agencies. 71 In that same survey, eighty-two percent of respondents stated that their agencies 
62 See generally People v. Hagos, 250 P.3d 596 (Colo. App. 2009). 
63 I d at 606-07. 
64 See NATAPOFF, supra note 57%. 
65 Id. 
66 Id at 57%. 
67 See Fox Butterfield, Guns and Jeers Used by Gangs to Buy Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/16/national/16gangs.html (relating that gang members were in the courtroom 
wearing tee~shirts that said HStop Snitching" when two other gang~members were on trial for murdering a ten~ year~ 
old). 
68 Rick Hampson, Anti-Snitch Campaign Riles Police, Prosecutors, USA TODAY, Mar. 28, 2006, 
http://www. usatoday .com/news/nation/2006~03~28~stop~snitching x.htm. 
69 NATAPOFF, supra note 57%, at 122-24. -
70 IMAGINING LEGALITY: WHERE LAW MEETS POPULAR CULTURE 59 (Austin Sarat ed., Univ. of Ala. Press 2011 ). 
71 John Anderson, Gang-Related Witness Intimidation 1, NATIONAL GANG CENTER BULLETIN (Feb. 2007). 
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were taking action to correct the problem. 72 A general sense of fear is not uncommon in a gang-
controlled locale marred by a history of violent retaliation against witnesses and a community-
wide distrust of the criminal justice system. 73 
Today, the wheels of justice have come to a near stop in some communities in significant 
part because the violence associated with witness intimidation by gangs has spread beyond gang 
members to those who live in gang-controlled communities?4 To compound the problem, the 
communities in which gangs proliferate tend to have a history of poor relations with local law 
enforcement on which gangs can capitalize. 75 Increased policing in violent neighborhoods, if 
ineffective, can garner the ire and distrust of the innocent civilians who reside there. 76 There 
exists a sentiment that the police fail to protect black Americans and thus cause the epidemic of 
drugs and violence concentrated in black neighborhoods. 77 Poor urban communities have a 
history of experiencing police brutality and racially discriminatory enforcement practices that 
72 ld. at 1. 
73 PETER FINN & KERRY MURPHY HEALEY, PREVENTING GANG- AND DRUG-RELATED WITNESS INTIMIDATION: 
ISSUES AND PRACTICES 1-2 (Nat' I Inst. of Justice 1996). This fear is not new: a history of the Jersey City police 
describes street gangs that were ~~composed of young rowdies" who would regularly insult or spit on women, but 
women would refuse to file formal complaints and "thus hinder the wheels of justice." COSTELLO, supra note 54£, 
at 330. 
7~ATAPOFF, supra note 57%, at 124 (observing that gang culture's "no snitching" code "melded with the long-
standing problem of witness intimidation, and the related reluctance of civilian witnesses to come forward when 
they observe violent crime"). 
75 ld at 126;see also PAUL B. WICE, CHAOS IN THE COURTROOM: THE INNER WORKINGS OF URBAN CRIMINAL 
COURTS 170-71 (1985) (observing that, in urban courts, defendants are often of lower socio-economic status which 
can affect their treatment by the court, including increasing the court's willingness to incarcerate poor uneducated 
defendants who have been through the criminal justice system before). 
76 Diana Nelson Jones, Don't Shoot: Stopping Urban Violence with Sweet Reason, PmSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 
Dec. 18,2011, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/11352/1197140-148.stm. 
77 RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAw 71 (Random House 1998); see id at 20 (observing that racially-
motivated misconduct appears disproportionately hannful and nefarious because it is official action by the state); 
see, e.g., Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern California (Bratton's 
Challenge: LAPD 's New Chief Believes Gang Problem Can Be Solved), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 2, 2004, 
http:/ /lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/articles/ ALL _p 1 side1.asp [hereinafter Bratton's Challenge] (explaining that 
history of poor relations with the LAPD increases the challenge of reducing crime, and the solution is increased 
investment in police officers who can become experts on particular neighborhoods). 
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have led to a history rife with distrust, actual and perceived injustice, and even rioting. 78 'This 
history contributes to the acquiescence of entire communities to the gang culture's code of 
silence, but it is not the only factor. 
Citizens in some gang-controlled communities must practice willful blindness to gang 
criminality in order to survive. 79 People who live in gang-controlled communities are subje·ct to 
constant fear and calculated intimidation, such as demands for money whenever a resident leaves 
his home, public drug sales and loitering by gang members, and attacks on person and property 
as retaliation for talking to the police. 80 In a recent Michigan case, an innocent witness who had 
information about the shooter in a gang-related attack refused to tell the police anything until he 
himself was threatened with an investigation. 81 He explained that the code of the street is 
"[don't] snitch," and he had to obey out of fear for his life, even though he wasn't a gang 
member.82 In fact, "[±]ear of gang retaliation among honest citizens in gang-dominated 
neighborhoods" has the added effect of forcing the prosecution to rely on unwilling or tainted 
witnesses, such as co-defendants, for testimony in gang cases because innocent witnesses refuse 
to cooperate or take the stand. 83 
78 See KENNEDY, supra note 77=!-6, at 115-20 (describing instances of police brutality, questionable acquittals of 
police officers by all-white juries, and the race riots that subsequently ensued). 
79See FINN, supra note 73=F2::, at4. 
Jd 
Many of the communities in which gangs operate are worlds unto themselves-places where 
people live, attend school, and work all within a radius of only a few blocks beyond which they 
rarely venture. As a result, victims and witnesses are often the children of a defendant's friends or 
relatives, members of the same church as the defendant, or classmates or neighbors. Furthermore, 
community residents may regard many of the crimes for which witnesses are sought as "business 
matters" among gang members or drug dealers, rather than as offenses against the community 
which should inspire willing civic participation in the process of law enforcement. 
80 Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern California (Living In Fear: 
Gangs Keep Stranglehold on Southland Cities), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 28, 2004, 
http:/ /lang.dailynews.corn!socal!gangs/articles/dnp3 _gang3 .asp [hereinafter Living in Fear]. 
81 Jones v. Warren, No. 1:07-cv-894, 2010 WL 3779277, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2010). 
82ld 
83 FINN, supra note73~, at 4. 
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Urban (predominantly black) communities have a different conviction rate than suburban 
(predominantly white) communities, depending on the type of crime. 84 In urban areas, drug 
felony convictions are highest; as a result, there is a high rate of imprisonment of the urban 
population on account of drug offenses. 85 In contrast, violent felonies are cleared by police at a 
significantly lower rate in urban neighborhoods than in suburban neighborhoods. 86 This is in 
large part due to "the economics of law enforcement," which aims to punish as many crimes as 
budgets allow. 87 Drug convictions are easy to prosecute and cheap to obtain. 88 With violent 
crime, on the other hand, prosecution is pricey and convictions are rare. Gangs-which operate 
primarily in urban communities-are incredibly effective at eliminating the witnesses necessary 
to prove violent felonies in a court of law. 89 An unintended result is that similar crimes are 
punished differently in different demographic communities.90 William Stuntz refers to this as 
"discriminatory justice" that "runs headlong into the moral argument for treating criminals and 
crime victims from different demographic groups the same."91 Witness intimidation by gangs, 
then, has not only a local effect on crime rates, but a broad impact on the administration of 
criminal justice and its sociological effects. 
A prosecutor from Suffolk County, Massachusetts relayed that witness intimidation not 
only "results from the tight-knit geography of poor neighborhoods where witnesses and gang 
members often know one another," but also because "gang members have become more 
84 Wll..LIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 55 (2011). 
85 ld 
86ld 
87Jd 
88ld 
89ld, at 79~81. 
90 STUNTZ, supra note 84&;, at 55. 
9lld 
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brazen."92 In California, a drug addict named Bobby Singleton was purchasing rock cocaine in 
an apartment building controlled by a gang known as The Mob Crew when a rival gang member 
opened fire.93 Injured in the cross-frre, Singleton told police he was able to identify the shooter, 
a member of the Primera Flats gang.94 When the shooter was released on bail, he appeared at 
Singleton's residence, instructed Singleton not to appear in court, stated "I will look for you and 
kill you," and flashed a gun.95 Two days later, the shooter returned in a van with his associates 
and took Singleton away.96 Singleton was found later that night on a bench, shot to death.97 Such 
a tragic ending for the innocent bystanders to, and victims of, violent crime is not a rarity in 
gang-infested communities, and such stories send a message to entire communities that all 
citizens-not just gang members-must remain silent on pain of death. 
Gangs' emphasis on loyalty coupled with a willingness to intimidate and retaliate renders 
it unsurprising when gangs interfere with a witness on behalf of a member who is on trial. Gang 
members will appear in court as observers because their mere presence can frighten witnesses 
into not testifying.98 Sometimes, a courtroom may be closed to the public,99 but generally the 
constitutional right to public trials and the fact that the intimidation may go undetected are 
impediments to combating such intimidation by associates of the defendant.100 Incarcerated 
witnesses are also in great danger of gang-related intimidation101 because gangs have members 
92 Butterfield, supra note 6766. . 
93 Urias v. Borel, No. CV 07-7155-NS (RNB), 2008 WL 4363064, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
94 Id. at *3. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at *4. 
97 Id. 
98 FINN, supra note73~, at xi. 
99 Rachel G. Piven-Kehrle, Annotation, Basis for Exclusion of Public from State Criminal Trial in Order to Preserve 
Safety, Confidentiality, or Well-Being of Witness Who Is Not Undercover Police Officer, 33 A.L.R.6th 1 (2008). 
10
° FINN, supra note7372-, at xi. 
101 I d. at xi- xii; e.g., David Kocieniewski, Not Scared, or Scalded, Into Silence, Ex-Gang Leader Takes Stand in 
Trenton Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,2007, 
http://www .nytimes.com/2007 /09/28/nyregion/28gang.html?ref=davidkocieniewski (describing how a former leader 
of Trenton's Latin Kings gang took stand in murder trial being attacked by another inmate for being a "snitch"). 
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and associates in prisons who will carry out "hits" and beatings as ordered to protect the 
defendant.102 Gangs will even target civilian witnesses and police officers, such as ex-officer 
Richard Elizondo, who in 1998 was shot and paralyzed in an attempted assassination days before 
he was to testify about a gang-related homicide, 103 or Martha Puebla, who testified for the 
prosecution in a gang-related double-murder case and was shot multiple times in retaliation a 
week later.104 
While sometimes the defendant is directly involved in ordering or causing witness 
intimidation, 105 it is often difficult to prove that a gang member-defendant directly ordered or 
perpetrated the intimidation himself.1 06 This is because a gang member often benefits from his 
gang's "no snitch" policy, which is enforced by witness intimidation and the threat of 
retaliation.107 The result is that the gang member-defendant may enjoy stalled prosecutions, 
dropped charges, or no charges at all by virtue of his membership in a gang that intimidates, 
retaliates against, or murders witnesses who may otherwise be willing to cooperate with 
police.108 Fear of a gang's retaliation can silence a witness even if the defendant didn't take any 
102 Gangster Menace, supra note 31M> (explaining that today, much of the violence is dictated by prison gangs that 
order killings and other crimes from within prison walls). 
103 Dana Bartholomew, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern California (Targets 
of Gang Violence), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2004, 
http:/ /lang.dailynews.com/socal!gangs/articles/dnp5 _main. asp. 
104 Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern California (Agony of 
Victims: Behind Each Tragedy Lie Grief and Heartache of Friends, Family), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2004 
http://lang.dailynews.com/socallgangs/articles/dnp4 _gang4.asp [hereinafter Agony of Victims]. 
105 E.g., U.S. v. Baskerville, Nos. 07-2927 & 11-1175,2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20869, at *2- 3 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 
2011). Just before William Baskerville, a Newark, New Jersey drug kingpin, was to go to trial on drug charges, the 
key witness against him was shot and killed by members of Baskerville's ''crew." ld. Federal prosecutors employed 
forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit McCray's prior statements, even though McCray was shot by an associate of 
Baskerville, not by Baskerville himself. Jd They were able to do so with evidence that Baskerville actually ordered 
the member of his "crew" to kill McCray. Jd Baskerville was sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to murder a 
witness, retaliate against a federal informant, and distribute drugs. I d. 
106 Smith, supra note 57%, at 21 (explaining that witness intimidation is perpetrated not only by defendants but also 
by their friends or associates, who may employ tactics such as packing the courtroom and staring down everyone in 
it). 
107 Jd 
108 E.g., David Kocieniewski, Keeping Witnesses Off Stand to Keep Them Safe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, 
http://www .nytimes.com/2007 /ll/19/nyregion/19witness.html?ref=davidkocieniewski; David Kocieniewski, Few 
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action. For instance, in the trial of two men charged with the drive-by shooting of an eight-year-
old boy, one of the two defendants benefited from a deadlocked jury because some witnesses 
recanted their testimony and others refused to speak at all out of fear of gang retaliation. 109 As a 
result, the convicted defendant received a life sentence, while the other smiled as he pleaded no 
contest to the reduced charge of voluntary manslaughter .110 When a gang enforces a "no snitch" 
policy against its own members and civilian witnesses, it substantially interferes with the 
criminal justice process, terrorizes neighborhoods, and grants a windfall to the defendant by 
virtue of his membership in a criminal enterprise. 
American courts' reliance on live testimony means that live willing witnesses are crucial 
to the administration of justice, 111 so without those witnesses silenced by gangs, their violent 
crimes go unpunished. A rule that allows in prior statements of witnesses silenced by gangs 
might increase conviction rates, specifically in those urban communities where violent crime is 
currently too expensive and too difficult for law enforcement to address proportionately. 
Addressing the gang witness intimidation problem will increase the possibility of prosecuting 
violent gang-member defendants, reducing crime and intimidation in those urban communities 
that currently suffer from "discriminatory justice" and increasing the effectiveness of prosecution 
in one class of crimes-violent felonies-that is currently under-prosecuted. 
Choices in Shielding Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28,2007, 
http://www .nytimes.com/2007 11 0/28/nyregion/28witness.html?re:f=davidkocieniewski (detailing how, in a 
quadruple homicide, prosecutors were forced to drop all charges due to the intimidation and murder of witnesses). 
109 Grieving Mothers, supra note 3534. Five witnesses recanted their statements to police and others refused to 
testify, which is a common problem among witnesses from the community, according to Deputy District Attorney 
Anthony J. Falangetti. ld 
110 Jd 
111 See STUNTZ, supra note 84~, at 79. 
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Ill: MEMBERSHIP IN A GANG THAT INTIMIDATES: WRONGFUL CONDUCT & EVIDENCE OF 
INTENT 
Successful intimidation or murder of government witnesses by members of a defendant's 
gang often weakens the government's case and can even force a prosecutor to drop all charges 
because the hearsay rule generally prevents absent witness statements from being put before a 
jury.112 Hearsay113 is not admissible into evidence unless it falls within delineated exceptions 
laid out in a jurisdiction's rules of evidence.114 If a witness becomes unavailable to testify, 115 his 
testimony will most likely remain subject to the hearsay ban. 116 So if a witness refuses to take 
the stand, flees the jurisdiction, or dies, it is likely that his prior statements to police or others are 
inadmissible unless the defendant previously had the opportunity to confront the testimony 
through cross-examination. 
However, there are some narrow exceptions to the hearsay rule, 117 one of which is called 
"forfeiture-by-wrongdoing." The federal evidence rules118 and some state codes have adopted 
this exception, 119 which is also recognized, with slightly different (and narrower) parameters, by 
112 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 802 (restyled) ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules 
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."). 
113 Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. FED. R. EVID. 801 (c). The restyled Rules of Evidence defme it as 
"a statement that: ( 1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party 
offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(l}-(2) (restyled). 
114 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 802 (restyled) ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules 
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."). 
115 The Federal Rules include examples of unavailability such as a court exemption from testifying due to a 
privilege, refusal to testify despite a court order, lack of memory of the declarant's statement, unable to testify due to 
death or infmnity, or absent from the proceedings despite reasonable attempts by the proponent of the statement. 
FED. R. EVID. 804(a). This list is not exhaustive. STEVEN GOODE AND OLIN GUY WELLBORN Ill, COURTROOM 
EVIDENCE HANDBOOK: 2011-2012 STUDENT EDITION 333 (West2011) {'4The listed grounds [in 804(a)] are 
illustrative, not exclusive."). 
116 See supra note 112~. 
117 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1}-(6). Five exceptions to the hearsay rule in the case ofwitness unavailability are 
included in the Federal Rules of Evidence: prior testimony subject to cross-examination, statement made under 
belief of impending death, a statement against interest, a statement about the declarant's personal or family history, 
and, last but not least, forfeiture by wrongdoing. Jd 
118See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
119 E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE§ 1350 (West 2012). 
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the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.120 The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing 
exception should be strengthened to combat witness intimidation by a defendant's gang so that a 
gang member-defendant will not profit at trial from the silence of adverse witnesses. Forfeiture-
by-wrongdoing rules should declare that the act of joining a gang with a known history of 
witness intimidation or retaliation-or the act of remaining a member of a gang that, during the 
time of membership, regularly utilizes witness intimidation-is sufficient to prove that the gang 
member-defendant had the requisite intent to silence an adverse witness who was intimidated or 
killed in the course of gang-related investigation or prosecution. 
Forfeiture-by-wrongdoing has its roots in English common law, 121 specifically a 1666 
case wherein the fact that the witness was "detained by the means or procurement of the 
prisoner" constituted a basis to admit the witness's prior testimony. 122 By the time of the 
founding, forfeiture-by-wrongdoing did not stand alone but was treated as a "species of 
unavailability" along with death and inability to travel, each of which was grounds to admit prior 
unconfronted testimony at tria1.123 
The equitable roots of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing are especially salient.124 The doctrine is 
not based in principles of agency or waiver, but equity: a man shall not profit by his 
120 See generally Giles v. Cal., 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (representing the Supreme Court's most recent assessment of the 
doctrine). 
121 Giles, 554 U.S. at 359 (referencing Lord Morley's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771 (H.L.1666); Harrison's Case, 12 
How. St. Tr. 833, 851 (H.L.1692); Queen v. Scaife, 117 Q.B. 238,242, 117 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1273 (Q.B. 1851); 2 W. 
Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 425 (4th ed. 1762); T. Peake, Compendium of the Law of Evidence 62 (2d ed. 1804); 
1 G. Gilbert, Law of Evidence 214 (1791)). 
122 ld (quoting Lord Morley's Case, at which judges concluded that a witness's having been "detained by the means 
or procurement of the prisoner" provided a basis to read testimony previously given at a coroner's inquest. 6 How. 
St. Tr., at 770 -71). 
123 Rebecca Sims Talbott, Note, What Remains of the "Forfeitted" Right to Confrontation? Restoring Sixth 
Amendment Values to the Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing Rule in Light ofCrawford v. Washington and Giles v. 
California, 85N.Y.U.L.REv.1291, 1310-11 (2010). 
124 ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN 
AMERICAN TRIALs 378 (3d ed. 2004). The forfeiture by wrongdoing exception arises not "from a belief that such 
statements are reliable, but rather from an equitable principle that parties should not be able to benefit from the 
absence of a declarant whom they made unavailable." ld 
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wrongdoing.125 Under forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, a defendant does not voluntarily waive his 
right to confrontation; rather, "the Rule withdraws the right" in response to the behavior of the 
defendant.126 Equitable principles are violated when a gang member-defendant enjoys a windfall 
because his cohorts, and not he, silence an adverse witness. While procedural safeguards such as 
permitting depositions and cross-examination by the defense prior to trial may help to safeguard 
against intimidation by the defendant, 127 the threat of witness intimidation by other gang 
members would remain, particularly in cases where entire communities are silenced by gang 
terrorization and control. 128 
A. The Evidentiary Rule 
Forfeiture by wrongdoing is codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b )( 6).129 It permits 
admission of otherwise inadmissible testimony if the witness is unavailable due to the 
wrongdoing of the either party.130 The evidence rule is broader than the exception to the 
constitutional right of confrontation both in what type of statement is admissible and in what 
125 Giles v. Cal., 554 U.S. 353, 379 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring) (asserting that in the case of a defendant who 
murdered an adverse witness, "[ e ]quity demands" a "showing of intent to prevent the witness from testifying" and 
that the majority opinion supplies the conclusion that "equity requires"); id at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The 
inequity consists of [Giles] being able to use the killing to keep out of court her statements against him. That 
inequity exists whether the defendant's state of mind is purposeful, intentional (i.e., with know ledge), or simply 
~robabilistic."). 
26 Park, supra note 124H4, at 378. 
127 See D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence Is Different: Taking Innocence Into Account in 
Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 869 (forthcoming 2012) (arguing that a defendant's motive 
to intimidate would be reduced by a procedure allowing for deposition of prosecution witnesses followed by a 
reasonable opportunity for cross-examination by the defense, ''coupled with the understanding that if anything 
happens to the witness before trial that results in unavailability or substantial change in position, the deposition will 
be available for use by the jury" ). In fact, Marian statutes ''directed justices of the peace to take the statements of 
felony suspects and the persons bringing the suspects before the magistrate, and to certify those statements to the 
court," and these "confronted statements" were admissible event if the declarant died or was unable to travel to 
court. Giles, 544 U.S. at 359 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43- 44; J. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the 
Renaissance 10-12,16-20 (1974)). 
128 See, e.g., Kocieniewski, supra note 15+4; Witnesses at Risk, supra note 13H. 
129 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
130 Id 
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must be shown to allow admittance. 131 Congress added this ruleto the Federal Rules in 1997, 
and, subsequently, a number of states adoptedit. 132 It is applicable to both parties, not just the 
defendant, and requires that ~'the party against whom it is offered (1) directly, or through others, 
(2) engaged in conduct that is wrongful (3) with the intent of producing the declarant's 
unavailability, (4) which was thereby procured," determined in most jurisdictions by a 
preponderance of the evidence standard. 133 Determinations of whether forfeiture occurred is 
generally subject to a Rule 1 04(a)134 proceeding.135 
A ruling of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing rule should be attainable by showing of 
membership in a gang for a sufficient period of time to suggest that the gang member-defendant 
had knowledge of his gang's intimidation tactics and intended that it put them to use in his favor. 
To bolster this method of admitting testimony of silenced witnesses, states with a forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing exception136 should add a-provision stating that joining or continued membership in 
a gang with a history of enforcing a "no snitching" policy against witnesses is sufficient evidence 
of intent to silence any witness against the defendant who is rendered unavailable by the 
131 It permits admission of testimonial and non-testimonial statements and only requires that the declarant be 
unavailable due to the defendant's wrongful conduct or his acquiescence in wrongful conduct by another party. ld 
In contrast, there is a specific intent requirement inherent in constitutional forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, which only 
applies to testimonial statements and is not coextensive with the evidentiary forfeiture-by-wrongdoing rule. Jd 
132 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 442 (6th ed. West 2006) .. 
133 I d. (emphasis added). However, some states have adopted a heightened ''clear and convincing" standard of proof 
instead. E.g., State v. Mason, 162 P.3d 396,404-05 (Wash. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1035 (2008) ("[T]he trial 
court must decide whether the witness has been made unavailable by the wrongdoing of the accused based upon 
evidence that is clear, cogent, and convincing. We recognize that this is not an easy standard to meet, but the right of 
confrontation should not be easily deemed forfeited by an accused."); People v. Geraci, 85 N.Y.2d 359, 367 (1995) 
(opining that "a defendant's loss of the valued Sixth Amendment confrontation right constitutes a substantial 
deprivation"). 
134 FED. R. EVID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning ... the admissibility of evidence shall be determined 
by the court ... [which is] not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges."). 
135 GOODE, supra note ill-1-().§., at 341. 
136 States that do not have a forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception are at a great evidentiary disadvantage, because 
without forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, there is a great incentive for a defendant to render government witnesses 
unavailable. See Giles v. Cal., 554 U.S. 353,365 (2008) ("The absence of a forfeiture rule covering this sort of 
conduct would create an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses against 
them."). The doctrine, even within constitutional parameters, cannot operate without an evidentiary rule in place 
allowing admittance of otherwise inadmissible statements made by an unavailable witness. 
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defendant's fellow gang members. In an evidentiary hearing, the court may hear when the 
defendant joined the gang, the number of years he was a member, and whether he had knowledge 
of his gang's practice of intimidating witnesses adverse to gang member-defendants. To prove 
these facts, a prosecutor may need to rely on the testimony of a turncoat gang member who has 
direct knowledge of the defendant's participation in the gang and of the gang's usual practices. 
It may also consider call community members or specific witnesses to relate the intimidation 
practices of the set to which the defendant's belongs. Finally, the prosecutor may call a gang 
expert to relate the history of the gang and its practice of intimidation, and he can also opine as to 
whether it is more likely than not that the defendant was aware of the gang's use of intimidation 
and retaliation and expected that his gang would engage in such tactics in his defense. Finally, 
the prosecution must offer evidence that a witness is unavailable due to intimidation, homicide, 
or other means of silencing by members of the gang. The immediate intimidation or murder, an 
expert's testimony that a gang regularly engaged in witness intimidation, both coupled with 
evidence that the defendant was a member of the gang during the time that the gang utilized 
these tactics and expected that his gang would so protect him should be sufficient to satisfy the 
preponderance of the evidence standard showing specific intent. 
Such a rule serves the equities on which the forfeiture doctrine is based by ensuring that a 
gang member-defendant who knowingly joins a criminal enterprise that intimidates witnesses 
will not prosper by the wrongdoing of his associates who intimidate witnesses for his benefit. 
Further, given the high occurrence of witness intimidation by gangs and the broad influence of 
gangs' "code of silence" over the communities under gang control, this rule would lessen the 
incentive for gangs to intimidate witnesses on behalf of a gang member-defendant because doing 
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so would not prevent admission of the testimony. In this manner, it would increase protection of 
witnesses. 
A rule that declares that membership ina gang with a known and enforced"no snitching" 
policy constitutes sufficient evidence of specific intent to silence adverse witnesses in gang-
related trials would pose minimal obstacles for the prosecution to admit non-testimonial 
statements of those adverse witnesses. 137 These statements are not subject to the constitutional 
requirement of specific intent put forth in Giles. 138 A mere showing of "acquiescence" in making 
the witness unavailable satisfies the federal rule. 139 Admitting evidence that the gang intimidates, 
retaliates against, or otherwise enforces a "no snitch" policy against witnesses on behalf of its 
members along with evidence that the defendant was aware of the "no snitch" policy when he 
joined or continued membership in the gang is certainly sufficient to show "acquiescense" and 
likely sufficient to show actual intent. Along with a showing that members of his gang actually 
did enforce a "no snitch" policy by intimidating or otherwise rendering an adverse witness 
unavailable is sufficient to satisfy the rule: the defendant's conduct was to join and remain an 
active member of a gang that enforced a "no snitch" policy, which actually caused fellow gang 
members to carry out the "no snitch" policy and intimidate witnesses adverse to him (had the 
defendant not joined and remained in the gang, his fellow gang members would not intimidate 
witnesses against him). Finally, the defendant acquiesced in the intimidation because he knew 
and likely expected that that he would receive aid from fellow gang members by means of 
intimidation tactics if he went to trial. 
B. The Sixth Amendment 
137 See infra note 161-Mt) and accompanying text, defming non-testimonial statements. 
138 Giles, 554 U.S. at 367. 
139 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
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In some cases, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is a second higher 
hurdle over which the prosecution must jump before it may invoke forfeiture by wrongdoing. 140 
The Founders were not vague in their declaration that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."141 This Sixth-
Amendment requirement applies to the states through incorporation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 142 Requiring live witness testimony not only protects the accuracy of the evidence 
presented to jurors, but it also "ensures a specific trial court process that has unique social value, 
insisting, with limited exceptions, upon the accused's right to cross-examine witnesses in 
court."143 At common law, if a witness was unavailable to testify in court, and if the defendant 
did not have a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witness's statements, then they were 
inadmissible unless one of two exceptions applied.144 The first was declarations made by a 
speaker "on the brink of death and unaware he was dying,"145 and the second was forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing.146 
The Supreme Court stated rn Reynolds, the case 1n which it first recognized the 
exception, 147 that 
"[t]he constitutional right of a prisoner to confront the witness and cross-examine 
him is not to be abrogated, unless it be shown that the witness is dead, or out of 
the jurisdiction of the court; or that having been summoned, he appears to have 
been kept away by the adverse party on the trial."148 
140 See infra text accompanying notes 162-l-§..:l..- 53. 
141 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
142 BROUN, infra note 132-±U-, AT 434. 
143 pARK, supra note 124!-l-4, at 414. 
144 Giles, 554 U.S. at 358. 
145 Id at 358- 59. 
146 !d. at 359. Note that the common law rules were codified in FED. R. EVID. 804(b), discussed supra note 117M+. 
147 Giles, 554 U.S. at 366. 
148 Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1878) (emphasis omitted). 
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The Court in Reynolds, according to the Court in Giles, relied on broad principles of forfeiture, 
but only where the defendant engaged in "wrongful conduct designed to prevent a witness's 
testimony."149 
Until recently, the Supreme Court required only that an out-of-court statement by an 
unavailable declarant bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability"' stemming from a "frrmly rooted 
hearsay exception" or "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" to pass constitutional 
muster.150 The effect was that satisfaction of the hearsay rules indicated that the 
ConfrontationClause requirements were satisfied.151 Commentators, most notable Dean Henry 
Wigmore, agreed that the Confrontation Clause protections operated sufficiently through the 
hearsay rule and its exceptions. 152 However, in 2004 the Supreme Court dispensed with the 
"indicia of reliability" scheme when it decided Crawford v. Washington. 153 Observing that the 
Confrontation Clause was intended to combat the use of ex parte examinations in favor of 
English common law's preferred practice of live testimony in an adversarial process, 154 
Crawford held, after an in-depth historical analysis, that courts should employ a categorical 
framework: testimonial statements may be "admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, 
and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine."155 Conversely, 
non-testimonial statements by an out-of-court witness were no longer subject to Confrontation 
Clause analysis at all. 156 
149 Giles, 554 U.S. at 366. 
1so Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
1s1 Park, supra note 143~, at 415. 
1s2 BROUN, supra note 142ill, at 435. 
1s3 541 u.s. 36,58 (2004). 
1
s
4 BROUN, supra note 142~, at437. 
ISS Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
1s6 !d. at 58. 
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The Court interpreted the Sixth-Amendment right "to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him"157 to apply to "those who 'bear testimony~ "'158 which is a "solemn declaration."159 
The Court set forth a "primary purpose" test to determine whether a statement is testimonial, 
explaining "[w]ithout attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable 
statements" that testimonial statements are those made with the intent to establish facts relevant 
to a future prosecution when there is no ongoing emergency. 160 In contrast, non-testimonial 
statements are those made "under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."161 So, in 
accordance with the Court's interpretation, the right of confrontation requires that testimonial 
statements-those made outside of emergency circumstances that establish facts relevant to 
future prosecution 162-are inadmissible unless offered by the live testimony of the declarant or 
unless an exception~ like forfeiture by wrongdoing, applies. 
Forfeiture-by-wrongdoing has most recently been shaped by the Court's decision in Giles 
v. California, 163 in which the Supreme Court set forth a requirement of specific intent.164 Prior to 
Giles, two distinct lines of cases had developed concerning the doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing. In the first, courts required that the defendant act with the specific intent to render 
a witness unavailable in order to invoke the exception, while in the other the courts were willing 
157 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
158 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
159 !d. (quoting 1 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). 
160 Davis v. Wash.t 574 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (Testimonial statements include those "taken by police officers in the 
course of interrogation ... when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no ongoing emergency, and that 
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution."); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (explaining that statements made in a police interrogation are testimonial, 
as in the facts of Crawford, as well as those made at a preliminary hearing, a grandjuryt or a former trial). 
161 Davis, 574 U.S. at 822; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 56 (including in its description of non-testimonial statements 
"an off-hand, overheard remark," "a casual remark to an acquaintance," and "business records or statements in 
furtherance of a conspiracy"). 
162 See supra note 160449- and accompanying text. 
163 554 u.s. 353 (2008). 
164 !d. at 367. 
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to admit evidence even where proof of specific intent was lacking. 165 In Giles, the Court 
approved the former approach, opining that the constitutional doctrine applies to testimonial 
statements only if the defendant "engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from 
testifying"; in other words, the witness must have been 'kept back' or 'detained' by 'means or 
procurement' of the defendant."166 Courts have interpreted Giles to require a showing that the 
witness is actually unavailable, that the defendant caused the unavailability, and that he did so 
with the specific intent to prevent the witness from testifying at trial. 167 
The specific-intent requirement limits the admissibility of unconfronted testimonial out-
of-court statements of unavailable witnesses unless the prosecution can show that the defendant 
intentionally procured the unavailability of the victim.168 Relying on an in-depth analysis of the 
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine at common law and Supreme Court precedent, Justice Scalia 
opined that "deliberate witness tampering" is the only context in which prosecutors have invoked 
forfeiture by wrongdoing, both at the time of the founding and in subsequent American 
jurisprudence, 169 and that "without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness 
from testifying," unconfronted testimony has always been inadmissible at trial. 170 Unlike the 
federal rule, the constitutional doctrine requires a showing that the defendant had the specific 
165 Marc McAllister, Down But Not Out: Why Giles Leaves Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Still Standing, 59 CASE W. 
REs. L. REv. 393, 397 (2009). For courts that required specific intent. see United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 
364, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Ohio 2005); People v. Moore, 117 
P.3d 1, 2-3 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004), overruled in part by State v. Davis, 158 
P.3d 317 (Kan. 2006); State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 534 (Wis. 2007). For courts that did not require specific 
intent, see People v. Moreno, 160 P.3d 242 (Colo. 2007); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 (Mass. 
2005); State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 855-56 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), affd, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. 2007). 
166 Giles, 554 U.S. at 359-60. 
167 E.g., Ridgeway v. Superintendent Conway, No. 10-CV-6037 (MAT), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92228, at *27-29 
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2011); People v. Toussaint, No. ST-10-CR-641, 2011 V.I. LEXIS 47, at *7 (V.I. 2011). 
168 Giles, 544 U.S. at 367. 
169 !d. at 366. 
170 Id at 361. 
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intent to silence a witness before the prosecution can invoke the doctrine. 171 The rule can make a 
very big difference in criminal prosecutions: recently, a criminal appeals court overturned the 
conviction of a man sentenced to death for violently killing his girlfriend because the trial court 
admitted testimonial statements made by the victim when the prosecution had failed to prove that 
the defendant killed her with the specific intent to silence her .172 
Since Giles v. California, the Supreme Court requires that the prosecution show that the 
defendant acted with the specific intent to render the witness unavailable in order to admit 
unconfronted testimonial statements made by an unavailable declarant. 173 In instances where a 
gang member-defendant's fellow gang members take it upon themselves to prevent witness 
testimony, the defendant may benefit and even escape prosecution altogether if the prosecution 
cannot show that the defendant specifically intended to intimidate that witness. 174 Successfully 
arguing that the decision to join a gang with an enforced "no snitching" policy is sufficient 
evidence of intent to silence any future witness against the gang member-defendant may lessen 
the benefit to the defendant garnered merely by virtue of membership in a gang that intimidates 
witnesses. 
Just three years after the adoption of the Sixth Amendment, the Superior Court of Law 
and Equity of North Carolina stated that the confrontation right was "founded on natural 
171 Id at 368. While the federal rule permits forfeiture if the defendant "acquiesced in wrongfully causing" a 
witness's unavailability, FED. R. Evro. 804(b)(6), the Supreme Court made clear in Giles that at common law the 
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing concerned "conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying.'' !d. at 367. 
Justice Scalia considered "the common law's uniform exclusion ofunconfronted inculpatory testimony by murder 
victims ... where the defendant was on trial for killing the victim, but was not shown to have done so for the 
purpose of preventing testimony," to be "conclusive" evidence that a specific intent requirement is proper. Id. at 
368. 
172 Hunt v. State, 218 P.3d 516, 518 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009) (applying the rule in Giles that "where the evidence 
suggested that the defendant wrongfully caused the absence of the witness, but had not done so to prevent the 
witness from testifying, unconfronted testimony was excluded unless it fell within the separate common law 
exception to the confrontation requirement for dying declarations) (citing Giles, 554 U.S. at 361). 
173 Giles, 554 U.S. at 359-60. 
174 See, e.g., Witnesses at Risk, supra note ll-h!- (describing examples of gang crimes that remain unsolved or 
unprosecuted because witnesses are scared to testify). 
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justice,"175 notions of which are violated when a gang-member defendant is granted a windfall 
resulting from the terror that his gang inflicts on adverse witnesses and the community at large. 
Invoking forfeiture by wrongdoing against a gang member-defendant on the basis of his gang's 
intimidation practices-if he joined the gang with knowledge of the practices-is consistent with 
the equitable principles underlying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine.176 Despite this, the 
holding in Giles, on its own, seems to foreclose this option unless the actual "joining" of the 
gang-or remaining a member knowing that the gang silences witnesses-is the conduct through 
which intent to silence adverse witnesses manifests. 
Direct evidence 177 of a defendant's specific intent is unnecessary to show sufficient 
proof, even in the wake of Giles. The Supreme Court's treatment of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing in 
domestic violence cases as well as jurisprudence underlying the co-conspirator exception to 
hearsay suggest that a rule permitting forfeiture when the defendant's gang-not the defendant 
himself--silences a witness is sufficient under the Giles rule. 
C. Analogue 1: Domestic Violence & Inferred Intent 
In its highly divided opinion, the Supreme Court singled out domestic violence in its 
discussion of the forfeiture doctrine in Giles v. California.178 Showing particular concern, both 
Justice Souter in his concurrence and Justice Breyer in his dissent argued that the lack of 
domestic violence cases at the time of the founding and prior renders Scalia's historical argument 
concerning specific intent inconclusive.179 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, made specific 
175 State v. Webb, 2. N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (1794). 
176 
"[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing ... extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds." 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; see also Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879); see PARI<, supra note 124-H-4. 
177 Direct evidence is defmed as "[p]roofwhich speaks directly to the issue, requiring no support by other evidence; 
proof in testimony out of the witness' own knowledge, as distinguished from evidence of circumstances from which 
inferences must be drawn if it is to have probative effect.'' BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (2010). 
178 554 u.s. 353, 377 (2008). 
179 !d. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring) ("The historical record as revealed by the exchange simply does not focus on 
what should be required for forfeiture when the crime charged occurred in an abusive relationship or was its 
29 
reference in dictum to the possibility of "inferring intent" in the case of an abuser who kills his 
victim if there is a history of abuse and intimidation intended to prevent his victim from seeking 
assistance or testifying against him.180 His oft-cited dictum states: 
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim from resorting 
to outside help~ and include conduct designed to prevent testimony to police 
officers or cooperation in criminal prosecutions. Where such an abusive 
relationship culminates in murder, the evidence may support a finding that the 
crime expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting 
abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution -- rendering 
her prior statements admissible under the forfeiture doctrine. Earlier abuse, or 
threats of abuse~ intended to dissuade the victim from resorting to outside help 
would be highly relevant to this inquiry~ as would evidence of ongoing 
criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been expected to testify. 181 
In short~ Justice Scalia acknowledges that in the case of domestic violence, a history of abuse or 
threats of abuse is relevant evidence of whether the act of killing his victim was intended to 
silence her. 182 The Court suggests, by this language, the possibility that a history of abuse or 
threats of abuse intended to dissuade a victim from speaking to authorities can give rise to an 
inference that~ in the culminating murder, the defendant intended to silence the witness, even if 
there is no evidence as to the defendant's state of mind at the time of the murder. 
Justice Souter, concurring, expressed assent to Scalia's statement and observed that an 
examination of historical cases and commentary affirms Scalia's conclusion about domestic-
violence relationships, noting a derth of "any reason to doubt that the element of intention would 
culminating act; today's understanding of domestic abuse had no apparent significance at the time of the framing, 
and there is no early example of the forfeiture rule operating in that circumstance."); id. at 395-96 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) ("We can see from modem cases that this occurs almost exclusively in the domestic violence context, 
where a victim of the violence makes statements to the police and where it is not certain whether the defendant 
subsequently killed her to prevent her from testifying, to retaliate against her for making statements, or in the course 
of another abusive incident. But 200 years ago, it might have been seen as futile for women to hale their abusers 
before a Marian magistrate where they would make such a statement.") (referencing State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 
459 (1868) (per curiam) ("We will not inflict upon society the greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic 
privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence.")). 
180 !d. at 377. 
181 !d. 
182 Id. 
30 
normally be satisfied by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in the classic 
abusive relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside help, including the aid of 
law enforcement and the judicial process."183 Both Souter and Ginsburg agree, then, that a 
history of isolation from law enforcement imposed by the abusive defendant can give rise to the 
inference of specific intent. Justice Souter makes the case succinctly: "If the evidence for 
admissibility shows a continuing relationship of this sort, it would make no sense to suggest that 
the oppressing defendant miraculously abandoned the dynamics of abuse the instant before he 
killed his victim, say, in a fit of anger."184 
Scalia makes certain that the standard is not "knowledge-based intent,"185 but something 
more; however, he does not explicitly foreclose the possibility that inferred intent could arise in a 
situation other than domestic violence if the requisite relationship and history of isolation and 
intimidation were present; in fact, he states that the treatment of domestic violence should be the 
same under Giles as any other serious crime, 186 such as gang violence and its resultant witness 
intimidation and murder. Domestic violence is often described as a unique form of violence 
wherein one person acts to control another through the use of threats and violence. 187 However, 
the use of terror and fear to prevent an abused partner (the victim and witness) from seeking the 
183 Id. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
184 Giles, 554 U.S. at 380. 
185 Id. at 377 ("This is not, as the dissent charges ... nothing more than 'knowledge-based intent."'). 
186 Id. at 376 ("In any event, we are puzzled by the dissent's decision to devote its peroration to domestic abuse 
cases. Is the suggestion that we should have one Confrontation Clause (the one the Framers adopted and Crawford 
described) for all other crimes, but a special, improvised, Confrontation Clause for those crimes that are frequently 
directed against women? Domestic violence is an intolerable offense that legislatures may choose to combat through 
many means-from increasing criminal penalties to adding resources for investigation and prosecution to funding 
awareness and prevention campaigns. But for that serious crime, as for others, abridging the constitutional rights of 
criminal defendants is not in the State's arsenal."). 
187 E.g., Isley Markman, The Admission of Hearsay Testimony Under the Doctrine ofFoifeiture-by-Wrongdoing in 
Domestic Violence Cases: Advice for Prosecutors and Courts, 6 CRIM. L. BRIEF 9, 13 (2011) ("The Court's dicta 
appropriately reflected both the unique nature of domestic violence relationships, in which one person acts to control 
the other, and the reality of domestic violence prosecutions, in which the only evidence may be statements made by 
the victim to law enforcement about prior incidents of domestic abuse that would be considered testimonial and 
subject to Crawford.") (emphasis added). 
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aid of authorities188 is not unique. Gangs also utilize terror and fear-in the form of targeted and 
community-wide intimidation and retaliation-to ensure that gang members and civilians (both 
victims and witnesses) do not report gang crime to authorities nor testify against gang members 
in court. 189 Just as an abusive spouse will employ tactics over the course of time designed to 
isolate his victim and prevent her from reaching out to authorities, 190 so do gang members take 
action over time designed to prevent entire communities from cooperating with law 
enforcement. 191 They punish specific witnesses for intimidation and retaliation when those 
witnesses dare to violate the "no snitching" code. 192 In both cases, showing specific intent to 
silence a witness can be prohibitively difficult. Witnesses-whether testifying against a 
domestic-violence abuser or a gang member-are often unavailable because they refuse to testify 
out of loyalty, will not take the stand for fear of retribution, or are unable to testify because they 
are murdered. Domestic abusers, in other words, enforce their own "no snitch" policy that 
silences the key witness to their crimes. Comparatively, gangs with a history of witness 
intimidation can and do subdue entire communities with violence and threats of violence for 
reporting crime and cooperating with law enforcement. 193 The dynamics of these relationships 
are similar, and in neither situation should the defendant profit from the enforcement of the "no 
snitch" policy by enjoying the terrified (or deathly) silence of an adverse witness in court. 
188 ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 51 (2d ed., 
Foundation Press 2008) ("Violence need only symbolize the threat of future abuse in order to keep the victim in fear 
and control her behavior."). 
189 Yee, supra note 5049-, at 777. ("[D]omestic violence cases are hardly unique ... in gang cases the accuser may 
be a fellow gang member, a rival gang member, or a member of the community where gangs have significant power 
and control ... [t]he gang member defendant or the defendant's fellow gang members have the power to threaten 
serious harm, thus intimidating the witness into not cooperating with the state in the prosecution."). 
190 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 188++7-, at 52 (observing, in abusive relationships, the development of"a pattern of 
domination and control by the enforcement mechanism used by the batterer"). 
191 See supra Part II. 
192 Id 
193 See supra Part II. 
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By sanctioning an inference of specific intent in the domestic violence arena, the 
Supreme Court leaves open the door for argument that direct evidence is not a requirement for 
successful invocation of forfeiture. Rather, evidence sufficient to show a history of intimidation 
with intent to silence suffices. It follows that a showing that the defendant knew of the 
intimidation practice yet joined or remained an active member of the gang, expected that the 
practice would be used to his benefit, and proof of intimidation of a witness by the gang, should 
be sufficient to invoke forfeiture-by-wrongdoing and protect the system of justice on which 
victims and society relies. 
D. Analogue 2: The Co-Conspirator Hearsay Exception, Conspiracy, and Intent 
The co-conspirator exception to hearsay is an evidentiary rule that treats as an admission 
by a party-opponent "a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy."194 Forfeiture-by-wrongdoing and the co-conspirator exception to 
hearsay are "analytically and functionally identical."195 They are similar in two ways: 
procedurally, the requirements necessary to invoke forfeiture-by-wrongdoing and the co-
conspirator exception to hearsay are by and large the same, and substantively, they are both 
doctrines that can involve an inference of that a defendant is responsible for the actions or words 
of another person. Both require a showing of specific intent, and for both, an affirmative finding 
can rest upon circumstantial evidence. The same degree of evidentiary support that is sufficient 
to support a conspiracy for the purposes of the co-conspirator exception to hearsay is applicable 
to forfeiture-by-wrongdoing. These stark similarities suggestthat a gang member-defendant 
who-in the terminology of conspiracy--"consciously participated" in an organization with a 
194 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
195 U.S. v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1912) (citing U.S. v. Sepulveda, IS F.3d 1161, 1180 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied 512 U.S. 1223 (1994)). 
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policy of enforcing a "no snitch" policy thereby forfeited his right to cross-examine any adverse 
witness silenced by his gang on his behalf. 
To invoke forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, the proponent must show that the declarant is 
unavailable due to wrongdoing that the defendant procured or to which he acquiesced, 196 all by, 
in most circuits, a preponderance of the evidence.197 If testimonial statements are in question, 
the proponent must also show that the defendant possessed specific intent to silence the 
declarant. 198 The proponent of a co-conspirator's statement under Fed. R.Evid. 80l(d)(2)(E) 
must show that a conspiracy existed, the declarant and the defendant were both parties to the 
conspiracy, and the declarant made the statement in furtherance of the conspiracy.199 Like 
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, all this must be shown under rule 104(a) by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 200 
For both the co-conspirator exception and forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, the threshold to 
meet the standard of proof is low and direct evidence is not required, both for practical as well as 
policy reasons. In the case of forfeiture of confrontation rights, 
[i]t seems almost certain that, in a case involving coercion or threats, a witness 
who refuses to testify at trial will not testify to the actions procuring his or her 
unavailability. It would not serve the goal of Rule 804(b)(6) to hold that 
circumstantial evidence cannot support a finding of coercion. Were we to hold 
otherwise, defendants would have a perverse incentive to cover up wrongdoing 
with still more wrongdoing, to the loss of probative evidence at trial?01 
Similarly, the co-conspirator exception to hearsay is supported by both practical and equitable 
rationales. Conspiracies tend to be clandestine in nature such that criminal activity is difficult to 
196 See supra text accompanying note 133~; FED. R. Evro. 804(b)(6). 
197 See Cotto v. Herbert, (2nd Cir., 2003), 331 F.3d 217, 235; U.S. v. Scott, (7th Cir., 2002), 284 F.3d 758, 762; U.S. 
v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (lOth Cir., 2000); U.S. v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (lith Cir., 200 I); see also, 
Steele v. Taylor, (6th Cir., 1982), 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (applying preponderance standard for preliminary fmdings in 
forfeiture-by-misconduct cases). 
198 See supra text accompanying notes 163-l-£. and 164-l-£.. 
199U.S. v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1281 (1912). 
200 Bourjaily v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). 
201 U.S. v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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prove, often rendering statements by co-conspirators crucial evidence for the prosecution. 202 
Further, it is appropriate to burden a conspirator with the "risk that false or inaccurate co-
conspirators' statements will be used against that person"203 once it has been proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he participated in a criminal conspiracy. 
Proving that a defendant is party to a conspiracy requires a showing of specific intent.204 
Circumstantial evidence can give rise to a defendant's "conscious participation" in a conspiracy, 
even if the defendant merely "had some idea of its criminal objectives" without knowing all the 
details of the crimes involved or other co-conspirators.205 Neither knowledge of a conspiracy, 
association with conspirators, nor the defendant's presence at the scene of a criminal act can 
alone constitute sufficient evidence of intent to participate in the conspiracy.206 Conspiracies 
include not only the planning and commission of the substantive crime, but also efforts to evade 
apprehension and prosecution, such as concealment. 
A person need not expressly agree to participate to be party to a conspiracy-actions can 
imply consent.207 Further, knowledge of an ongoing conspiracy, while insufficient in itself, can 
serve as the basis for an inference of specific intent.208 This informs the forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing analysis in that a gang member-defendant who has knowledge of his gang's 
enforcement mechanisms, yet joins the gang or remains an active participant, and then profits 
202 RONALD J. ALLEN, ET AL, EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 484 (4th ed. 2006). 
203 See id. Another rationale is that co-conspirators are deemed to have authorized statements made by co-
conspirators, but it is largely an artificial explanation, id., that rests on principles of agency, which are not implicated 
in the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing analysis. 
204 JuliaN. Sarnoff, Federal Criminal Conspiracy~ 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 663~ 671 (2011); Palmer v. People, 964 
P.2d 524~ 527 (Colo. 1998) ("The crime of conspiracy requires two mental states ... the specific intent to agree to 
commit a particular crime ... [and] the specific intent to cause the result of the crime that is the subject of the 
agreement."). 
205 Sarnoff, supra note 204m.~ at 671. 
206 !d. 
207 US. v. Klein, 515 F.2d 751, 753 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing Direct Sales Co. v. US.~ 319 U.S. 703, 709 (1943); U.S. v. 
Lester, 282 F.2d 750, 753 (3d Cir., 1960)). 
208 Direct Sales Co., 319 U.S.at 711 ("Without the knowledge~ the intent cannot exist.'~); Klein~ 515 F.2d at 753 
("Knowledge of the illicit purpose will also serve as the foundation for the required proof of specific intent."). 
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from the gang's retaliatory practices, can give rise to the inference that he expected and intended 
for his gang to silence adverse witnesses. Such evidence should be treated as sufficient to show 
specific intent to procure the unavailability of a witness under a preponderance of the evidence 
standard. 
In addition to the analogous natures of the co-conspirator exception and forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing, conspiracy itself has served as an underlying rationale for invocation of forfeiture-
by-wrongdoing, even where a defendant was not formally changed with a conspiracy. The Tenth 
Circuit first addressed the question of whether forfeiture can be enacted by the actions of another 
person. It held in the affirmative, establishing what is now known as the Cherry doctrine. The 
Cherry doctrines relies on the assertion that both the Confrontation Clause and evidence 
exceptions are met if "the wrongful procurement was in furtherance, within the scope, and 
reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of an ongoing conspiracy."209 
Since then, some circuits have held that "acquiescence" is co-extensive with co-conspirator 
liability under Pinkerton liabililf10 for the purposes offorfeiture-by-wrongdoing.211 
In Cherry, the court allowed forfeiture-by-wrongdoing even while admitting that there 
was "absolutely no evidence [the defendant] had actual knowledge of, agreed to or participated 
in the murder of' the declarant.212 It reasoned that the requirements of conspiracy were met 
because it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that his co-conspirator might silence the 
witness in furtherance of the conspiracy.213 Similar to the inference of intent to silence in 
209 U.S. v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (lOth Cir. 2000). 
210 See Pinkerton v. U.S., 328 U.S. 640 (1948). 
211 See U.S. v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950 (7th Cir.2002) (adopting the Cherry doctrine). 
212 Cherry at 814 (quoting Price). 
213 !d. at 820 (holding that a defendant waives his hearsay objection and confrontation rights if the wrongful 
procurement of a witness's silence ''was in furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary 
or natural consequence of an ongoing conspiracy"). The Seventh Circuit, in adopting the Cherry doctrine, relied on a 
strict interpretation of"reasonably foreseeable"; however, subsequent decisions are apply the "reasonably 
foreseeable" language less stringently. Adrienne Rose, Note, Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles: 
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domestic violence murders, the court in Cherry stated that imputed waiver of confrontation rights 
under the Cherry doctrine may be used to admit hearsay even though the defendant is not 
convicted of the underlying crime. This is because the standard for showing forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing is preponderance of the evidence, while the standard for conviction of the 
substantive offense is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, a prosecutor need not even 
charge a defendant with a conspiracy in order to utilize the Cherry doctrine to admit hearsay.214 
Application of the Cherry doctrine is based on a showing of "acquiescence" by the 
defendant, not necessarily specific intent. This gives rise to the question of whether the Cherry 
doctrine can survive an analysis under the Giles Court's requirement of "specific intent" to 
silence declarants of testimonial statements. Cases in which a defendant is a member of a gang 
that enforces a "no snitch" policy-and the defendant can be shown to have both expected to 
benefit and did benefit from that enforcement-should survive Giles, because a showing of 
specific intent to silence need not be supported by direct evidence but instead can be established 
by inferences from circumstantial evidence that it is more probable than not that the defendant 
expected to benefit from the enforcement policy, which should be treated as intent to silence. 
In the case of gang-perpetrated witness intimidation, if a gang-member defendant sees his 
gang defend other members through witness intimidation, knows that they engage in retaliation 
against witnesses, and yet remains an active member, then when he benefits from that 
enforcement policy when adverse witnesses in his trial are silenced, the preponderance standard 
can be satisfied. 215 Moreover, it should be satisfied to serve the equities. This outcome will 
Whether a Co-conspirator's Misconduct Can Forfeit a Defendant's Right to Confront Witnesses, 14 N.Y.U. J. 
Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 281, 302-03 (2011). 
214 Rose, supra note 213~, at 300. 
215 Recall Wigmore's "doctrine of chances" as a means to prove intent, which he explained as "the instinctive 
recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the 
same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all." JOHN H. WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
JUDICIAL PROOF AS GIVEN BY LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL 
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prevent gang member-defendants from profiting from their gang's enforcement of brutal and 
terrifying "no snitch" policies. 
IV: CONCLUSION 
The problem of witness intimidation by street and prison gangs is a serious impediment 
to justice, not only because it can undermine the prosecution of crime but also because it fosters 
a dynamic of fear and isolation in gang-controlled communities. Gangs have an incentive to 
silence witnesses because, unless the prosecution can trace the conduct back to the defendant, 
statements by the unavailable witness are often inadmissible at trial.216 One means to combat 
this is to adopt a provision stating that a showing that a defendant in a gang-related trial who 
joins or continues active membership in a street gang with a history of enforcing a "no snitch" 
policy against witnesses is sufficient evidence from which a fact-finder may conclude that the 
defendant specifically intended any resultant intimidation of adverse witnesses against him by 
his fellow gang members. 
TRIALS 133 (Little, Brown, and Co. 1013). By way of example, he described two hunters in the woods, with hunter 
A walking ahead of hunter B. Id. If hunter A hears a bullet whistle past his head once, he is willing to assume 
hunter B accidently pulled the trigger or aimed poorly. I d. But if, soon after, a second bullet goes by, and then a 
third, which strikes him, hunter A may well assume hunter B intended the shot. Id 
216 See supra Part III. 
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